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CONTROVERSY, CONSENSUS, AND THE CONCEPT OF 
DISCRIMINATION 
GEORGE RUTHERGLEN* 
The fortieth anniversary of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 affords us a 
timely opportunity both to celebrate what it accomplished and to reflect on 
what we have yet to achieve in seeking racial justice.  Professor Days has 
addressed these issues with the insight and perspective available only to 
someone who is a distinguished scholar and teacher, a civil rights lawyer and 
advocate, and a former Solicitor General of the United States.  It is a privilege 
to offer my observations in association with his, both on the occasion of the 
Childress Lecture and in this issue of the Saint Louis University Law Journal. 
Any assessment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 must begin with the 
recognition that it represents a long step toward fulfilling the promise of Brown 
v. Board of Education2 and that much remains to be done to fulfill that 
promise.  The Act represents the democratic endorsement, codification, and 
commitment to eliminating discrimination from public life: in the words of 
Alexander Bickel, the principle that “discrimination on the basis of race is 
illegal, immoral, unconstitutional, inherently wrong, and destructive of 
democratic society.”3  “Discrimination,” as we commonly use the term and as 
Bickel used it in this passage, refers to any consideration of race in public 
decisions, whether by government or by private individuals or institutions that 
control access to employment, housing, or public accommodations.  As the 
Supreme Court said in an early case interpreting Title VII of the Act, an 
employer violates the law if it “simply treats some people less favorably than 
others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”4  Or, as 
Title VII now provides, a plaintiff establishes a violation by proving “that race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any 
employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.”5 
 
* John Barbee Minor Distinguished Professor and Edward F. Howrey Research Professor, 
University of Virginia School of Law. 
 1. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964). 
 2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 3. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 133 (1975). 
 4. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977). 
 5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (1994). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1022 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 49:1021 
This is, I submit, our ordinary concept of discrimination—the one that is 
the most widely accepted and the least controversial—but it is not our only 
concept of discrimination.  Title VII itself also prohibits neutral practices with 
a disparate impact, provided the employer cannot justify them as “job related 
for the position in question and consistent with business necessity.”6  Title VII 
also allows affirmative action in some circumstances, for instance when an 
employer takes account of race, national origin, or sex in order to “break down 
old patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy.”7  These extensions of the 
ordinary concept of discrimination—and there are others to be found 
throughout civil rights law8—mark the point at which consensus breaks down 
over what the law requires or permits.  Alexander Bickel, for instance, 
vehemently opposed affirmative action.  In a continuation of the passage just 
quoted, he says, referring to the principle against discrimination: “Now this is 
to be unlearned and we are told that this is not a matter of fundamental 
principle but only a matter of whose ox is gored.  Those for whom racial 
equality was demanded are to be more equal than others.”9  Where the ordinary 
concept of discrimination runs out, disagreement and controversy begin. 
Let me illustrate this point by more fully considering the provision from 
Title VII quoted earlier, making proof that race, national origin, sex, or religion 
was “a motivating factor” for an employment decision sufficient to establish a 
violation of the statute.  The immediate occasion for the passage of this 
provision was the development of disputes over mixed-motive cases, those in 
which discriminatory reasons and legitimate reasons combined to result in a 
disputed employment decision—in the employer’s refusal to hire or to promote 
the plaintiff or to discharge the plaintiff based both on good reasons and bad 
reasons.  This is a complex issue that is also addressed in a variety of other 
provisions in the statute, but it implicates other and more profound 
controversies over Title VII.  This definitional provision was thought by some 
to outlaw affirmative action in employment,10 but other provisions enacted 
with this one in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 preserved, and in some respects 
encouraged, affirmative action.11  In a telling qualification, the statutory 
 
 6. Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). 
 7. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979). 
 8. For additional examples, consider the law of sexual harassment and the duty of 
reasonable accommodation, the latter as it applies to both religious practices and disabilities.  For 
cases illustrating the controversies over these issues, see, for example, Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., 
Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002) (accommodation of disabilities); Burlington Indus., Inc.  v. 
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998) (sexual harassment); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 
U.S. 63 (1977) (accommodation of religious practices). 
 9. BICKEL, supra note 3, at 133. 
 10. See 137 CONG. REC. 22,549 (1991) (statement of Sen. Dole). 
 11. In particular, § 116 of the Act provides that  “[n]othing in the amendments made by this 
title shall be construed to affect court-ordered remedies, affirmative action, or conciliation 
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definition of prohibited discrimination itself recognizes these limits on its 
scope.  It applies “[e]xcept as otherwise provided” elsewhere in Title VII.12  
This qualification reveals as much about the power of the concept of 
discrimination as about its limits.  It establishes the default condition for 
proving a violation of the statute: a showing that race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin was a motivating factor in a disputed decision.  When to allow 
an exception to this prohibition is invariably a controversial question, as the 
issue of affirmative action well illustrates.  But the prohibition itself provides 
the common ground on which such disputes arise. 
The reasons why the prohibition provides the common ground perhaps are 
obvious, but they are worth recounting because they are so frequently 
overlooked and their force so frequently underestimated.  To speak in strictly 
categorical terms, these reasons invoke a combination of pragmatic 
effectiveness with individualism, universality, and limited government—four 
characteristic, if not defining, features of American government.  As an initial 
matter, prohibitions against discrimination were tailored to the immediate task 
of dismantling Jim Crow in its most obvious form of explicit segregation on 
the basis of race.13  Once these prohibitions were effectively enforced, such 
blatant forms of discrimination were soon abandoned.14 
Applying these prohibitions to hidden forms of discrimination has proven 
to be more difficult, as has their extension to entirely new grounds of 
discrimination, such as sex, age, and disability.  The strategy of the law in all 
these areas, however, has been basically the same: to narrowly construe 
exceptions that allow discrimination on otherwise prohibited grounds, such as 
the exception for bona fide occupational qualifications on the basis of sex,15 
and to engage in detailed case-by-case analysis of claims that otherwise neutral 
practices and legitimate reasons serve, in fact, as pretexts for discrimination.16  
Both elements of this strategy preserve and enhance the focus of the law on the 
individual and not on characteristics that he or she is, by and large, powerless 
to change. 
This focus on individuals leads to another attractive feature of laws against 
discrimination: that anyone can invoke their protection.  The legal rule is only 
against considering specifically identified grounds of discrimination—favoring 
one race, ethnic group, or sex at the expense of another.  The universal 
 
agreements, that are in accordance with the law.”  Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 
§ 116, 105 Stat. 1071, 1079 (1991). 
 12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (1994). 
 13. See, e.g., David Lyons, Corrective Justice, Equal Opportunity, and the Legacy of Slavery 
and Jim Crow, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1375, 1389-90 (2004). 
 14. Id. at 1390-91. 
 15. Id. § 2000e-2(e)(1).  E.g., UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 200–01 (1991); 
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333–34 (1977). 
 16. E.g., Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147–49 (2000). 
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coverage of such laws has been emphasized from the beginning.  As early as 
the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 17 sponsors of such legislation, which in that case 
protected “all persons” within the jurisdiction of the United States,18 have 
appealed for passage on the ground that everyone was protected from 
discrimination.  As Senator Lyman Trumbull said in the debate over that Act, 
“this bill applies to white men as well as black men.  It declares that all persons 
in the United States shall be entitled to the same civil rights . . . .”19  The same 
case was made for the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which, like its predecessors 
enacted during Reconstruction, protects “any individual” from 
discrimination.20 
With the passage of other laws against discrimination, such as the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)21 and the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA),22 the principle of universal coverage has been eroded, 
but in a manner that confirms rather than undermines the principle itself.  The 
ADEA protects only individuals who are at least forty years old,23 and as we 
recently learned from the Supreme Court, the Act does not protect even 
covered individuals from discrimination on the ground that they are too young, 
only that they are too old.24  The ADA likewise applies only to a “protected 
class” of disabled individuals who suffer from “a physical or mental 
impairment that substantially limits one or more. . .major life activities.”25  Yet 
neither of these limitations on coverage absolutely excludes any segment of the 
population.  As the Supreme Court pointed out in a decision on age 
discrimination under the Constitution, a classification based on age does not 
define a “discrete and insular” minority; instead, the classification in that case, 
requiring police offices to retire at age fifty, “marks a stage that each of us will 
reach if we live out our normal span.”26  By the same token, the coverage of 
the ADA is not confined to individuals disabled from birth.  It protects anyone 
unfortunate enough to become disabled, and indeed, by the estimate of 
Congress when it passed the statute, the ADA covers 43 million Americans.27  
It is only a slight exaggeration to say that both of these statutes provide for 
 
 17. 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (1994)). 
 18. Id. 
 19. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 599 (1866). 
 20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994). 
 21. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 
(1967) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–34 (1994)). 
 22. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–213 (1994)). 
 23. 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (1994). 
 24. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 600 (2004). 
 25. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). 
 26. Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313–14 (1976) (per curiam). 
 27. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 484–86 (1999). 
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universal coverage because almost anyone could fall within the scope of their 
protection. 
This principle of universal coverage, expanding the number of people who 
benefit from laws against discrimination, would be intolerable if it imposed 
equally large burdens on those who must obey these laws.  But the legislation’s 
expansive scope in one direction is offset by countervailing limitations in 
another.  Title VII, to take my main example, tells employers only what they 
may not consider—race, color, national origin, sex, and religion—not what 
they must consider in making personnel decisions.  In hiring, firing, and 
otherwise dealing with their workers, employers are left free to set their own 
standards for employment.  They are required only to treat all their workers 
equally according to those standards.  As compared to more onerous forms of 
centralized regulation and control, prohibitions against discrimination leave 
employers with the freedom to structure their personnel practices and policies 
as they see fit. 
At least, that is the primary constraint on laws against discrimination.  It, 
too, has been eroded as the grounds of prohibited discrimination have 
increased.  Federal law identifies only a handful of such grounds, but this list 
has grown and is likely to continue to do so.  Thus, employers cannot take into 
account veteran status, union membership, or actions taken as a whistle-
blower.28  State laws have extended the list still further, to characteristics such 
as sexual orientation and marital status.29  The longer the list of characteristics 
that an employer cannot consider, the fewer the factors an employer may 
consider and the more they function like factors that an employer must 
consider.  An expanded list of prohibited factors threatens to narrow the 
permissible grounds for employment decisions to a short list of indisputably 
relevant factors, which an employer might nevertheless evaluate differently 
than a court, a jury, or an administrative agency.  Nevertheless, even this 
process must come to a halt at some point, and recent decisions have 
emphasized the difference between disagreeing with an employer’s offered 
reasons and finding them to be discriminatory.30 
All four of these features of laws prohibiting discrimination—pragmatic 
effectiveness in eliminating discrimination, individualized consideration and 
application, universal coverage of any individual, and inherent limitations on 
government regulation—stop well short of justifying any form of affirmative 
 
 28. See 5 U.S.C. § 2301(b)(9) (1994) (whistle-blowers); 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1994) (union 
members); 38 U.S.C. § 4311 (1994) (veterans). 
 29. E.g., CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 12940(a) (West 2004 Supp.) (sexual orientation, marital 
status, and other factors); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-103(Q), 5/2-102(A) (2000) (marital status 
and other factors). 
 30. E.g., McCoy v. WGN Cont’l Broad. Co., 957 F.2d 368, 370–74 (7th Cir. 1992); 
Hanchey v. Energas Co., 925 F.2d 96, 98 (5th Cir. 1990). 
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action, and in numerous respects, they argue against allowing it at all.31  These 
arguments have been ably articulated by the critics of affirmative action, and I 
will not repeat them here.  What is surprising is how these arguments are 
reflected in the contours of permissible affirmative action.  Thus, the recent 
decisions on affirmative action at the University of Michigan both struck down 
the preference in undergraduate admissions that conferred a numerical 
advantage on members of designated minority groups and upheld those in the 
law school based on individualized consideration of race and national origin, 
along with a variety of other factors that promote diversity in higher 
education.32  The law school’s plan allowed anyone to claim the benefit of the 
preferences at issue, regardless of whether they fell within the racial and ethnic 
groups identified for special treatment, so long as they could point to their 
individual contribution to diversity.  In doing so, it echoed the individualist and 
universalist reasons supporting prohibitions against discrimination.  The same 
point can be made about the voluntary nature of these affirmative action plans: 
No government regulation forced the university, even if it was a public 
university, to undertake these programs.  And the most fundamental reason for 
upholding these affirmative plans relies directly on the need to reject the 
legacy of Jim Crow.  As Justice O’Connor frames this reason in her opinion for 
the Court in Grutter v. Bollinger, “[i]n order to cultivate a set of leaders with 
legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry, it is necessary that the path to leadership 
be visibly open to talented and qualified individuals of every race and 
ethnicity.”33  Neutral admissions criteria that result in only token representation 
of minorities at the elite colleges and universities in this country would be 
unacceptable.  In the terms used under Title VII, colleges and universities can 
take voluntary steps “to break down old patterns of racial segregation and 
hierarchy.”34 
These points, of course, do not add up to a full defense or complete 
justification of the Supreme Court’s decisions on this issue.  My point is that 
these decisions and the preferences on the basis of race and national origin that 
they uphold are controversial precisely because they contravene the simple 
command not to take these factors into account.  Again, in terms of Title VII, 
race and national origin would have been “a motivating factor” in the decisions 
governed by the preference, “even though other factors also motivated the 
practice.”35  Yet the Supreme Court, and other institutions of government as 
well, have taken steps to minimize the divergence between the affirmative 
 
 31. For a recent critique of affirmative action, see generally Peter H. Schuck, Affirmative 
Action: Past, Present, and Future, 20 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1 (2002). 
 32. See generally Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 
306 (2003). 
 33. 539 U.S. at 332. 
 34. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979). 
 35. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (1994). 
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action plans that they uphold and the prohibition against discrimination that 
these plans violate.  The letter of this prohibition might be violated, but the 
reasons that support its adoption and acceptance remain respected. 
Whatever the weakness of these decisions as a matter of logic, much can 
be said for them in terms of popular appeal and acceptability.  Public support 
for programs of affirmative action is strongest when they are framed in the 
ambiguous and uncertain terms of that phrase itself.  As Owen Fiss wrote some 
time ago, the phrase itself does not tell employers what to do, only that they 
must do something.36  In fact, the phrase derives from an implied contrast with 
an omission or failure to act, most often by government, and has found its way 
into civil rights law, and indeed, into the literal terms of Title VII, from the law 
of equitable remedies.37  The statute explicitly confers authority on judges to 
“order such affirmative action as may be appropriate.”38  For instance, judges 
may order employers not just to cease discriminating but also to take 
affirmative steps to compensate for past discrimination and to prevent its 
recurrence.39  In polls over the past several decades, about fifty percent of all 
respondents favor affirmative action in these terms: as general support for 
recruiting and training programs that increase the opportunities available to 
members of minority groups.40  When it is defined more specifically, as a 
preference on the basis of race or national origin, support declines 
dramatically, to less than thirty percent.41  Support falls still further and 
becomes overwhelming opposition for any preference that is mandatory in any 
sense and becomes, in effect, “a rigid quota.”42 
The account of the overlapping consensus on civil rights that I have 
offered here fits the contours of disputes across a wide range of issues in 
employment discrimination law.43  I do not mean, however, to advance the 
nearly tautological claim that disagreements break out where the overlapping 
consensus breaks down.  My claim is that the prohibition against 
discrimination, endorsed by that consensus, structures the debate and 
influences the law on issues outside the area of its immediate application, 
outside of claims of intentional discrimination.  On issues such as affirmative 
 
 36. Owen M. Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 235, 310–11 
(1971). 
 37. See, e.g., Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 158 (1908). 
 38. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Charlotte Steeh & Maria Krysan, The Polls—Trends: Affirmative Action and the Public, 
1970–1995, 60 PUB. OPINION Q. 128, 134 (1996). 
 41. Id. at 130. 
 42. Id. at 132. 
 43. See, e.g., Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002); Burlington 
Indus., Inc.  v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 
(1977). 
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action, the prohibition against discrimination affects the outcome of issues that 
it does not, by itself, resolve.  Yet the reasons that support the prohibition—in 
terms of history, morality, and political appeal—continue to exercise authority 
beyond the boundaries of the prohibition itself.  Its reach, we might say, 
exceeds its grasp. 
Many writers and advocates for civil rights have lamented this state of 
affairs.  It is common practice for academics to decry the prohibition against 
discrimination as merely a formalistic device that constrains the pursuit of true 
equality.  It is, on this view, a solution to yesterday’s problems: to forms of 
explicit segregation and discrimination.  Such problems have largely 
disappeared from view, only to be replaced by less visible practices with the 
same result.  Critics of this limited concept of discrimination (and I count 
myself among them44) have not, I now think, given sufficient credit to the force 
and appeal of this principle.  If it doesn’t solve our problems today, at least it 
gives us a good indication of what they are and what the acceptable solutions 
to these problems might be.  We might want to go beyond the principle against 
discrimination—or even go against it—in order to achieve equality in some 
broader sense.  But we must do so with an eye to the values that made that 
principle acceptable in the first place.  Neglecting those values threatens to 
make any attempt to achieve equality, in any form, ineffective.  Taking account 
of those values, on the other hand, offers us a way to mold the principle against 
discrimination to the new challenges that we face without losing sight of—and 
indeed, continuing to draw strength from—the accomplishments of those who 
supported and enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
 
 
 44. E.g., Mary E. Becker, Prince Charming: Abstract Equality, 1987 SUP. CT. REV. 201; 
George Rutherglen, Discrimination and Its Discontents, 81 VA. L. REV. 117 (1995); Reva B. 
Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles 
over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470 (2004). 
